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Abstract
Linear demand formulations for price competition in horizontally differentiated products are
sometimes used to compare situations where additional varieties become available, e.g. due
to market entry of new firms. We derive a consistent demand system to analyze such
situations and highlight potential problems that can arise from an inconsistent approach.
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In industrial economics, often the following expression is used to model price com-
petition in horizontally di⁄erentiated products: There are n product varieties with













This formulation goes back to Shubik and Levitan (1971), is used in many models,
and can be found in text books like e.g. Vives (2001), p. 163. The formulation
is analytically tractable and has a very intuitive interpretation: Demand decreases
directly in the own price but additionally if the own price increases above the price
average, where the parameter ￿ describes how closely the di⁄erent markets are
linked. An important feature of this demand system is that it can be derived from
a representative consumer with quasi-linear preferences that can be represented by





































2 Varying the number of goods
It is often interesting to compare situations where di⁄erent numbers of varieties
are available. Consider, for instance, the decision problem of a consumer with
preferences for di⁄erent varieties of cereals who goes to the supermarket and realizes
that the varieties m+1;:::;n are sold out. How much does she buy from the varieties
that are available? Or consider a market where some varieties will be o⁄ered if and
only if new ￿rms enter the market. How do prices, quantities and welfare change
if such market entry occurs? Suppose that qj = 0 for j = m + 1;:::n, i.e., some
varieties are not available because they are sold out or entry did not occur. In this





































1See Vives (2001), p. 163. Note that there is a typo, where for the last term in the utility
function it reads
P





1Note that (2) di⁄ers from the utility of a consumer who is not interested in goods
j = m+1;:::n. Such a consumer would also consume qj = 0 for j = m+1;:::n, but





subtle change a⁄ects the demand for all the other goods. A consumer with utility
function (2) who cares about goods j = m + 1;:::;n that are not available and is
constrained not to buy them has the following demand functions for the available














for j ￿ m ￿ n: (4)
On the other hand, a consumer who does not care about goods j = m + 1;:::;n
















(1 ￿ pj ￿ ￿ (pj ￿ p)) for j = 1;:::;m;
(5)
where p denotes the "average price".
It is a standard approach to model competition in horizontally di⁄erentiated
products by assuming that there are n ￿rms, and each ￿rm i = 1;:::;n; produces
a di⁄erent good. Obviously, there are many interesting questions concerning the
number of ￿rms active in an industry. In this analytical framework, varying the
number of ￿rms is often modeled as varying the number of goods available, i.e. by
comparing situations in which some goods j = m + 1;:::;n are not available to a
situation in which they are available and in which the consumer would buy them.
One might therefore be tempted to use (5) and perform comparative statics with
respect to the number of products m: Typical examples using (5) or some structurally
identical formulations, are the analysis of exclusion of ￿rms (e.g. Ordover and Sha⁄er
(2007), Kovenock and Roy (2005), or Bourreau et. al. (2007)) or incentives to
merge (Inderst and Wey (2004)) or other forms of comparative statics with respect
to the number of ￿rms (Fries et. al. (2006)).
This approach, however, seems problematic. It makes a di⁄erence for the demand
system whether a consumer is constrained not to buy some goods or whether he
voluntarily abstains from buying them. Therefore, if one would use the formulation
(5) to evaluate market outcomes for m and m+1 (e.g. in order to analyze the e⁄ect
of the entry of one additional ￿rm), not only the number of products is changed but
also the underlying demand structure. Therefore, it will not be possible to easily
disentangle which of the two changes drives the results.
23 Example
As an illustration, consider the following problem of exclusion. There are n = m = 3
￿rms in a market, each charging a price of 1
2: According to (4) with m = n (and
according to (5)), each ￿rm could sell qi = 1
6: Now imagine that ￿rm 1 and ￿rm 2
manage to exclude ￿rm 3 from the market while still charging p1 = p2 = 1
2 (e.g. by









consistently analyze the e⁄ect of such an exclusion, we need to use demand function
(4) with m = 2 and n = 3 for determining the new equilibrium quantities, which
are given by q1 = q2 = 3
16; implying an increase in sales for the excluding ￿rms of
￿q1 = ￿q2 = 1
48
However, if we would use (5) for the analysis and just reduce m from 3 to 2; we
would implicitly assume that consumers no longer care about the third product ￿
which seems strange, since in the initial situation they actually bought it. Further-
more, the prediction of such an approach would be that the new quantities after the
exclusion would be b q1 = b q2 = 1
4; implying a larger gain in sales for the two excluding
￿rms of 1
12 each. However, this change is a combined result of the exclusion and
the change of the underlying demand system, while the di⁄erence derived in the
previous paragraph can be attributed exclusively to exclusion. Thus, when using
(5) and just varying m; one might make mistakes in the positive analysis; in this
example by overestimating the incentive for such an exclusionary practice.
Furthermore, a consistent welfare analysis2 requires that the two demand func-
tions in the two situations are derived from the same consumer, while the demand
functions (4) and (5) are derived from di⁄erent consumers. This is important, in
particular when evaluating normatively the e⁄ects of exclusion, market entry and
entry deterrence.
4 Conclusion
Therefore, if linear demand systems shall be employed to analyze the e⁄ect of vari-
ations in the number of available products, we propose to use the consistent formu-
lation (4).
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Appendix
How to derive (4):






























































































Plugging (8) into (6) then yields the result in the paper.
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